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DDASaccident523

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 27/01/2008	Accident number: 523
Accident time: Not made available	Accident Date: 02/09/2005
Where it occurred: Not made available	Country: Chad
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)	Secondary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident	Date of main report: Not made available
ID original source: None	Name of source: [Name removed]
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast	Ground condition: not recorded
Date record created:	Date last modified: 27/01/2008
No of victims: 2	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not made available	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)

safety distances ignored (?)

visor not worn or worn raised (?)

mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)

Accident report

Details of this accident have been withheld by the demining NGO that employed the Victim. A spreadsheet including the Victim's name and very brief details of the accident was made available in 2007. Some details can be inferred from the information released. For example, the face injury implies that the victim's visor was not being worn in the correct manner.

This entry will be expanded if access to the report of the investigation is made available in future.

The spreadsheet data is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

"Date and country. [Name removed] - Section leader - lightly injured on the side of the left eye - eyesight not endangered.

[Name removed] - Deminer - injured right foot, 3 toes ripped off.

Mine explosion type PMA3, excavating sand from two destroyed vehicles when deminer stood on mine."

Victim Report

Victim number: 689	Name: [Name removed]
Age:	Gender: Male
Status: supervisory	Fit for work: presumed
Compensation: Not made available	Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued: Not recorded	Protection used: Not made available

Summary of injuries:

minor Eye

minor Face

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Victim Report

Victim number: 690	Name: [Name removed]
Age:	Gender: Male
Status: deminer	Fit for work: not known
Compensation: Not made available	Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued:	Protection used: Not made available

Summary of injuries:

AMPUTATION/LOSS: Toes

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis

This accident is classed as a "Missed-mine accident" because the deminer was excavating and stood on a mine while doing so. It must be presumed that he only stood on an area that he knew was safe.

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim was working in a manner that led him to miss a mine and his errors were not corrected. It is possible that the supervisor was close to him because he was supervising at the time, so safety distances may not have been ignored.

The PMA-3 is a small mine and very difficult to detect but, being inside a vehicle, a metal-detector could not have been used anyway. At 110mm diameter, it should have been detected during any excavation to an appropriate depth.

The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the management of the demining group declined to make the accident details available. Although this is sometimes done to protect the Victims, in this case the Victims’ names were among the limited detail made available. It is possible that the managers have chosen to avoid transparency because they are afraid that the circumstances of the accident would reflect badly on their organisation.